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Abstract: The EU-Canada Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) provides for the free 
movement of goods, persons and capital to various degrees and its depth and breadth remain 
to be seen, as a high profile next generation WTO plus Agreement. CETA may well become a 
model for future mega regionals, for reasons of its new model and scope.  It is quite 
significant that CETA and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are 
treated as related agreements.  TTIP and TPP signified a shift towards the regulatory 
structures of the so-called mega regionals. The evolution of CETA as a survivor of a new 
form of second generation free trade agreement achieves all the more prominence for its 
efforts. As a result, while modest enough in relative terms in contrast with TTIP or CETA it is 
still an important effort to integrate developed legal orders and construct new configurations 
of global governance.  This account thus considers the nature and substance of CETA. 
Section I the background to the CETA negotiations, ratification challenges, the aims and 
benefits of the text, followed by in Section II, detailed consideration of its legal provisions 
and Conclusions. 
6 keywords: Global Governance, Mega regionals, Integration, EU law, International 
Relations  
Introduction 
The EU-Canada Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) has been heralded as the best, most 
ambitious and the most progressive form of trade agreement by leading European Union 
actors that the EU has ever concluded, the so-called ‘gold-plated’ trade deal.1 It is high praise 
indeed for a legal agreement given the broad range of EU agreements under negotiation or 
concluded in the post-Lisbon period with, inter alia, Singapore, South Korea, Columbia Peru, 
Georgia, India, Malaysia, Japan, Thailand and Vietnam, covering a diverse range of areas and 
fields, including controversial ones such as investment. Given that it is such a vast country 
from the perspective of its territory, but with such a small population and in the shadow of its 
giant land-bordered neighbour, Canada represents an interesting choice of partner for the EU 
obtaining its most ambitious agreement yet. The EU is Canada’s second biggest trading 
partner after the US. CETA has been signed by the Council on 30 October 2016 after a 
dramatic stand-off with the Wallonia Parliament in Belgium on the inclusion of inter alia an 
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  See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/index_en.htm. See such descriptions in many press releases 
and EU official briefings on CETA: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1570 (e.g. EU Council 
president, or from EU Commissioner for Trade). 
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Investment Court System therein, delaying the signing of the Agreement intended to have 
been signed off at the EU-Canada summit of 2016.
2
 A Strategic Partnership Agreement 
between the EU and Canada has also been signed in the same term period as CETA as the 
basis for deeper ties in areas from justice, sustainability, the rule of law, the environment and 
human rights.
3
  It is essentially a WTO plus Agreement, which features provisions on 
science, education, justice, the environment. It notably contains a standard positive human 
rights clause and its inclusion in the Canadian agreement, with a country having a 
tremendous history and record of innovative rights protections and yet constituting a clause 
demanded by the Member States, demonstrates the delicate act of collaborating with a highly 
developed partner.  
The CETA negotiations have been criticised for their entire evolution in secret, contrary to 
the stated goals and aims of the Treaty of Lisbon as regards openness and good conduct by 
the EU as an international actor, albeit by no so many voices.
4
 The late in the day application 
of transparency to CETA e.g. to declassify the negotiation directives 6 years after the 
negotiations and after their conclusion maybe regarded somewhat unimpressive to say the 
least and thereby ‘piggybacking’ upon TTIP’s innovative practices.  CETA has of course not 
been subjected to the same level of transparency as TTIP and yet is treated as an entirely 
similar legal exercise.
5
 It is thus difficult to discern the true nature of CETA and its evolution.  
CETA provides for the free movement of goods, persons and capital to various degrees and 
its depth and breadth remain to be seen, as a high profile next generation ‘WTO plus’ 
Agreement. CETA may well become a model for future ‘mega regionals’, for reasons of its 
new model and scope.  CETA is frequently now even mooted as a possible model within the 
arduous Brexit negotiations. It is quite significant that CETA and the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) are treated as related agreements within the mega regionals.
6
 
Since CETA was intended as its forerunner post-Trump this comparator may need further 
calibration.  
                                                          
2
 http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10972-2016-REV-1/en/pdf (signature) 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10974-2016-INIT/en/pdf (provisional application) 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13541-2016-INIT/en/pdf (joint interpretative instrument). See 
L. Ankersmit, CETA Investment Court to be investigated by the ECJ, in European Law Blog, 31 October 2016, 
www.europeanlawblog.eu in  http://europeanlawblog.eu/2016/10/31/investment-court-system-in-ceta-to-be-
judged-by-the-ecj/  
3
 Strategic Partnership Agreement between the EU and Canada (Council doc. 5368/2/2016) (5 August 2016) 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5368-2016-REV-2/en/pdf .  The EU and Canada have 
operated under a 1976 Framework Agreement for Commercial and Economic Cooperation and many 
declarations and action plans e.g. 1996 Joint Action Plan and the 1998 EU-Canada Trade Initiative and sectoral 
bilateral agreements in science, an agreement on mutual recognition, veterinary, wine, air safety and air 
transport. The legal effect of CETA was to terminate in particular the 1998 Agreement on Mutual Recognition.  
4
 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ‘Transformative Transatlantic Free Trade Agreements without Rights and Remedies 
of Citizens?’ J Int Economic Law (2015) p. 579. 
5
 Petersmann, ibid; Gallo, Daniele and Nicola, Fernanda, The External Dimension of EU Investment Law: 
Jurisdictional Clashes and Transformative Adjudication (June 8, 2016). Fordham International Law Journal, 
Forthcoming; American University, WCL Research Paper No. 2016-23; Fahey, E. & Bartl, M. A Postnational 
Marketplace: Negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In: E. Fahey & D. Curtin 
(Eds.), A Transatlantic Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on the Relationship between the EU and US 
legal orders. (pp. 210-234). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014 
6
 E Fahey, ‘On The Benefits Of The TTIP Negotiations For The EU Legal Order: A Legal Perspective’ Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration, 2016, p. 327. 
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One of the most challenging questions of the post-Brexit and new Trump era are to 
understand what its consequences are for global governance. TTIP and TPP signified a shift 
towards an era of ‘mega regionals’, an era where its subjects and objects became more 
challenging.
7
 They signified highly specific forms of global governance across regions and 
are now perhaps already history at the outset of the Trump presidency. A world of liberalised 
cooperation through transnational regulatory integration structures is thus much further from 
sight. Certain parts of the world e.g. African countries may be leaving ICC jurisdiction and 
the UK may well leave the ECHR but this is not yet the full picture of the new era of global 
governance. In particular, the evolution of CETA as a survivor of a new form of second 
generation free trade agreement achieves all the more prominence for its efforts. As a result, 
while modest in contrast with TTIP, it is still an important effort to integrate developed legal 
orders and construct new configurations of global governance. CETA also stands out within 
the EU’s Global Strategy launched in June 2016, where it is labelled as a desirable form of 
international regulatory cooperation, similar to TTIP.
8
 
This account thus considers the nature and substance of CETA. Section I the background to 
the CETA negotiations, ratification challenges, the aims and benefits of the text, followed by 
in Section II, detailed consideration of its legal provisions and Conclusions.  
I.1. Background to the CETA Negotiations  
The CETA Negotiations began in 2006 initially in 12 areas, before the Treaty of Lisbon and 
after many pivots in EU trade policy, reputedly after Canada was unhappy to be left off the 
list in 2006 for new preferential trade agreements. The French Presidency in 2007 was also 
seen as significant to push along the negotiations.
9
 The agreement now reached with Canada 
was predicated on the inclusion of provincial level purchasing has been described as a turning 
point, without which the deal would not have been done and also coloured the EU’s approach 
to the negotiation of the agreement.
10
 It now appears to offer billions of euros of revenue on 
procurement for the EU and consensus appears to emerge as to the role of the EU as a 
hegemonic power in the realm of trade liberalisation, showing its dominance over the 
Canadians negotiators.  The CETA negotiations were completed in 2014 and a legally 
reviewed or ‘scrubbed’ text was published in 2016.  
 
                                                          
7
 See E Benvenisti, ‘Democracy Captured: The Mega-Regional Agreements and the Future of Global Public 
Law’ GlobalTrust Working Paper Series 08/2015; See J Larik, Critiquing the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP): Systemic Consequences for Global Governance and the Rule of Law, Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration, 2016, p. 423.  
8
 Shared vision, Common action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and 
Security Policy (June 2016), http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-
european-union, p. 41.   
9
 Woolcock, Stephen (2011) European Union trade policy: the Canada – EU closer economic relations and 
trade agreement (CETA) towards a new generation of FTAs? In: Huebner, Kurt, (ed.) Europe, Canada and the 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Routledge studies in governance and change in the global era. 
Routledge, London, UK, 21-40. 
10
 The demand by the EU that provisional representatives be included in the Canadian negotiation tem was seen 
as a surprise. The provinces are not obliged since the 1937 Labour Conventions decision to implement accords 
concluded by the federal government in provincial fields of jurisdiction. 
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I.2. Ratification challenges 
CETA became mired in challenges since the move in Summer 2016 to sign the Agreement on 
the EU side as a mixed not an exclusive agreement, allowing a vast range of EU Parliaments 
the opportunity to vote and possibly upset the long negotiated deal (e.g. UK House of Lords 
but most audibly in Wallonia). The European Commission has been reportedly ‘waiting on 
the side-lines’ for the outcome of Opinion 2/15 EU- Singapore Agreement EU Free Trade 
Agreement with Singapore (EUSFTA) as to whether the Union has exclusive competence to 
conclude EUSFTA alone before the CJEU on this specific point.
11
 The Commission 
nonetheless proposed to the Council to sign CETA as a mixed agreement in 2016 after 
considerable pressures from the Council and Member States. The European Commission has 
won several cases before the Court of Justice in recent times post-Lisbon on the questions of 
exclusive competence.
12
 Member States have argued that certain forms of investment under 
CETA do not fall within exclusive competence because it is not mentioned by Article 207 
TFEU.
13
 Additionally, a number of national parliaments stand opposed to the agreement, 
particularly as to the investment chapters and a longstanding row between Canada and 
Romania and Bulgaria concerning visa free access which has been denied to them alone 
unlike all other EU Member States, causing them to allege discriminatory treatment.
14
 In the 
end, concessions made to Wallonia in the form of the interpretative instruments have 
sufficiently appeased the Wallonian Parliament subject to an agreement to send controversial 
provisions to the Court of Justice which now appears to be faltering, discussed below in 
greater detail. Advocate General Sharpston handed down her Opinion on EUSFTA on 
December 21 2016 finding that the EU-Singapore Agreement could only be concluded by the 
EU and the Member States acting jointly,  in a broad reading of shared competence.
15
 Much 
hangs now on the Court’s view thereof. 
II.1. Overview of the CETA Agreement Legal provisions 
Ch. 13 provides for a chapter on financial services including the cross-border supply of 
financial services, Ch. 14 on International Maritime Transport Services, Ch. 15 on 
Telecommunications, a very short chapter on electronic commerce in Ch. 16, Ch. 17 on 
Competition Policy limited to the Agreement between the EC and Canada from 1999 on the 
application of their competition law. Ch. 19 contains a lengthy and detailed text on 
government procurement, regarded as a considerable new market for the EU, Ch. 20 on 
Intellectual Property.  CETA is defined in its definitions chapter as a free trade area which is 
compatible with GATT Article XXIV (Article 1.4). A limited set of provisions on e-
                                                          
11
Kleimann, David and Kübek, Gesa, The Signing, Provisional Application, and Conclusion of Trade and 
Investment Agreements in the EU. The Case of CETA and Opinion 2/15 (November 2016). Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2016/58  
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/43948/RSCAS_2016_58.pdf?sequence=1  
12
 E Fahey The Global Reach of EU Law Abingdon: Routledge, 2016, Ch 2.  
13
 Many member states argue that the broad scope of the new FTAS (including investment, professional 
qualifications, intellectual property, labour rights, environmental protections etc) requires their ratification as a 
mixed agreement. 
14
 ‘Visa dispute to haunt EU-Canada trade pact’ EUObserver.com  (24 August 2016). 
15
 Opinion Procedure 2/15 initiated following a request made by the European Commission, Court of Justice, 




commerce looks especially vulnerable after the Advocate General struck down the EU-
Canada Passenger Name Record Agreement in 2016 for reason of its inadequacy data 





II. 2. Regulatory Cooperation  
The EU is perceived to have pushed regulatory cooperation to the limit within CETA in its 
joint committee procedures albeit that it is still within the confines of an Free Trade 
Agreement.  The CETA Agreement is arguably first and foremost heavily predicated upon 
elements of experimentalist governance so as to reduce the trade effects of differences in 
regulatory policies. As Hoekman states, the main area where CETA will make a contribution 
is as a learning or discovery device whereby specific policy areas can be identified for further 
multi-lateral cooperation.
17
 Effective regulatory cooperation requires going beyond legally 
binding treaties between states and towards experimentalist governance. The final text must 
be said especially in the area of regulatory cooperation to be heavily guided by voluntary 
cooperation (e.g. 21.2.6) and further possible cooperation (21.7) and positive affirmations for 
each other’s right to regulate. It remains to be seen whether such principles actually guide the 
final EU text. Nevertheless, the objectives of the cooperation are far-reaching in 21.3.b, 
including to improve transparency and predictability in the development of regulations, 
enhance the efficacy of regulations, identify alternative instruments, avoid unnecessarily 
regulatory differences and improve regulatory implementation. The EU has been highly 
explicit- even triumphalist- that all Canadian imports will have to satisfy EU rules and 
regulations on technical rules, product safety, food and safety, health and safety, GMOs and 
this puts the future of its regulatory cooperation chapter (in Ch 21) into sharp perspective.  
The Agreement makes provision for regulatory cooperation in Ch. 21 of the Agreement and 
applies laterally to Chs. 4 (Technical Barriers to Trade), 5 (Sanitary and Phytosantiary 
Measures, 9 Cross Border Trade in Services, 22 (Trade and Sustainable Development) 23 
(trade and labour) and 24 (trade and environment).  Ch. 28 provides for exceptions (e.g. 
taxation and national security). CETA is perceived to be a difficult model for UK firms 
seeking to sell financial services to the EU, by not precluding regulatory and licencing 
requirement e.g. as for so-called ‘passporting’ rights. Article 21.3 identifies a broad range of 
regulatory cooperation objectives of a particular high standard, including as to the protection 
of human life, health and safety. Article 21.4 on regulatory cooperation activities is couched 
heavily in the language of experimentalist learning and provides for a relationship where the 
parties will discuss regulatory reform, identify lessons learned, explore alternative approaches 
and exchange experiences.  In particular, Article 21.4 makes provision that the parties would 
compare methods and assumptions. Article 21.6 provides for a regulatory cooperation forum 
to be co-chaired by the senior representatives of the Canadian Government and a senior 
representative of the European Commission where the parties discuss regulatory issues and 
generally encourage bilateral cooperation (21.6.2(d). In particular CETA envisages further 
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 See opinion 1/15 Advocate General Mengozzi (8 September 2015) 
17
 See Hoekman, above.  
6 
 
voluntary cooperation in non-food product safety areas. The RCF is only obligated to meet at 
least annually.  
21.4.h provides for a loose form of cooperation as to the development, adoption, 
implementation and maintenance of international standards, guides and recommendations. 
This differs significantly from proposed texts within TTIP as to international cooperation.
18
 
Sophisticated principles as to methodologies and research agendas are also provided for 
within 21.4. One might question whether the engagement with stakeholders appears more 
modest than initially predicted.  The nature of the expectations that the text creates is a mish-
mash of power being devolved to the regulatory cooperation forum and Joint Committee 
without necessarily water-tight parameters. One issue as to the regulatory cooperation and 
joint committee powers is the question of sequencing and first mover obligations. One might 
remark overall that the provisions are considerably less sophisticated that the latest draft of 
the EU’s proposals for Regulation Cooperation after 15 rounds of TTIP negotiations, as 
released in 2016.  
 
III. 3. Absence of direct effect 
The CETA text denies private party enforcement in domestic courts, and in particular direct 
effect, in common with an EU approach to this effect post Lisbon. It aligns EU law more 
closely with NAFTA as a result.
19
 Article 30.6 thus provides that: 
‘ nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as conferring rights or imposing 
obligations on persons other than those created between the Parties under public 
international law, nor as permitting this Agreement to be directly invoked in the 
domestic legal systems of the Parties’ 
Some have criticised the CETA text for going significantly beyond other FTAs e.g. EU-
Singapore.
20
 Moreover, the European Commission has never publicly explained this shift 
which appears legally inconsistent with the provisions of the EU treaties as to a diverse of 
provisions as to rights, EU action in the world. This state of affairs creates a highly 
undesirable enforcement gap and as a result, renders the place of judicial review and judicial 
redress all the more important. It thus puts the desirability of investment protection redress 
provisions and judicial enforcement of CETA centre-stage because of its capacity to radically 
alter the place of private parties within the EU legal order and their ability to invoke public 
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 A Alemanno ‘The Regulatory Cooperation Chapter of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: 
Institutional Structures and Democratic Consequences’ J Int Economic Law, 2015, p. 625. 
19
 Semertzi, “The Preclusion of direct effect in the recently concluded EU Free Trade Agreements” (2014) CML 
Rev. p. 1125. 
20
 See Petersmann, above. 
21
 M Bronckers ‘Is Investor–State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Superior to Litigation Before Domestic Courts?: 
An EU View on Bilateral Trade Agreements’ J Int Economic Law; Joseph Weiler, ‘European Hypocrisy: TTIP 
and ISDS’, www.ejiltalk.org (21 January 2015) http://www.ejiltalk.org/european-hypocrisy-ttip-and-isds/. See 
also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Transformative Transatlantic Free Trade Agreements without Rights and 
Remedies of Citizens?’, (2015) Journal of International Economic Law.  
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II. 4. Investment Protection and Dispute Settlement 
In February 2016, the European Commission agreed with the Canadian Government to 
amend the controversial investment protection clause so as to take on board the EU’s new 
approach to investment and dispute settlement, making provision for a permanent 
institutionalised dispute settlement tribunal. The CETA and TTIP texts specify far more 
precisely the normative content of the obligations on fair and equitable treatment. By 
contrast, the comparable TPP provision is highly indeterminate.
22
 Although further comment 
is outside the scope of this, its inclusion within CETA was trialled as a forerunner to the TTIP 
negotiations and its acceptance by Canada as a highly developed was intended as a means to 
legitimise its inclusion. In order to appease the Wallonians and disquiet in certain Member 
States, the interpretative instrument agreed by the Member States in late 2016 is of interest, 
as are post-signing developments. For example, the European Parliament rejected a request 
by 89 MEPs to refer the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for an opinion in November 2016. The 
European Parliament’s Legal Service found no contradiction between CETA’s investment 
chapter and the EU Treaties when it assessed this issue in June this year.
23 
 Nevertheless, its 
inclusion in CETA in whatever format epitomises the challenges of integrating highly 
developed legal orders and opening up the EU to accusations of privileging private 
actors.
24
An even greater challenge is whether the concerns of the CJEU in its landmark 
opinion on EU accession to the ECHR, Opinion 2/13 are now reflected in the ‘legally 





5. The Exceptions 
As de Mestral states, CETA is in all probability the most lengthy and complex free trade 
agreement ever drafted amongst the new generation mega regionals, grounded in WTO law 
and following NAFTA. A vast range of key for example agricultural products are excluded 
from the scope of the agreement whilst others will only receive limited duty free access. 
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 See Jan Kleinheisterkamp, ‘Is there a Need for Investor-State Arbitration in the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP)?’, LSE Paper (17 March 2014): 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2410188; Ingolf Pernice, ‘International Investment 
Protection Agreements and EU Law’, in Studies on Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Provisions in the 
EU’s International Investment Agreements commissioned by the European Parliament’s Directorate-General 
for External policies in September 2014, at pp. 137–138 (EP Doc. Expo/B/INTA/2014/08-09-10): 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/534979/EXPO_STU(2014)534979(ANN01)_EN.p
df .  
25
 See http://rf.llb.be/file/6f/5811e50fcd70fdfb1a589e6f.pdf (the so-called Wallonia deal); Opinion 2/13 Opinion 
of the Court (Full Court) of 18 December 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. See Lenk, Hannes; (2016): An 
Investment Court System for the New Generation of EU Trade and Investment Agreements: A Discussion of the 
Free Trade Agreement with Vietnam and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada; 
European Papers (www.europeanpapers.eu). https://doi.org/10.15166/2499-8249/64; J Hepburn ‘CETA’s New 
Domestic Law Clause’ www.ejiltalk.org (17 March 2016) http://www.ejiltalk.org/cetas-new-domestic-law-
clause/. Latest CETA legal text at time of writing:   
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf   
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However, its content is considerably expanded e.g. with provisions on sustainable 
development, environmental and labour standards and e commerce. There are a considerable 
range of exceptions in the text- described as unprecedented, as to taxation, national security, 
cultural industries and the environment. There are exceptions to general principles, 
exceptions to an exception, declarations of application, limitations, clarifications, caveats, 
carve outs, exclusions, grandfathering.
26
 As a result, the objectives of the provisions appear to 
be to reach a very high level of bilateral cooperation whilst also preserving regulatory space, 
using the rigid model of a free trade area rather than a customs union.  
 
V. Conclusions: Is CETA the best model for global governance? 
CETA in its final text has done much to place high levels of health and safety, the 
environment and sustainability at the heart of the Agreement and to repeatedly emphasise the 
need for Canadian products to comply with EU law and governance standards. The place of 
civil society also within the text may well operate to mitigate concerns about the intentions of 
the text. The disenfranchisement of citizens is a common complaint as to the CETA text as 
much as TTIP and EU law, where market citizens, investors, companies and economic actors 
receive a privileged place within the text. Public opposition to CETA has piggybacked upon 
TTIP opposition. In this regards, some unfairness is palpable in so far as the EU has placed 
nearly of its position papers in negotiation online for TTIP, which have a weak down load 
rate in contrast to the millions signing up to oppose TTIP. In the case of CETA, these 
transparency practices have not been adopted and yet the same opposition emerges.
27
 CETA 
surely represents a looser more modest form of new-generation agreement, which aspires to 
high ideals albeit with a lesser geographical span envisaged and with much modesty in how it 
approaches integration between legal orders. As a result, perhaps it is not necessarily a 
replicable model of best practice integration between legal orders. Nevertheless, it may yet 
contain important triggers for further developments in next generation integration between 
legal orders and prove to be quite a significant starting point, as a sort of phoenix amongst the 
wreckage of the ‘mega regionals’.  
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